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1) Broad Patterns of Popular Black Attitudes
1 .
In their mammoth empirical analysis of the prospects for peaceful 
negotiation and change in South Africa, Hanf and his associates^ found 
ample evidence of a basis for compromise in South Africafs political arrange­
ments. More recently the same pattern has emerged from research conducted 
2)by Schlemmer. What these and other studies show is that very substantial 
proportions of black people in principle are willing to accept constitutional 
arrangements for the future in which whites retain substantial political 
power, or in which representation is on a group basis avoiding the prospect 
of black political domination by sheer force of numbers. Furthermore, most 
rank-and-file blacks, despite sharp discontent, are still willing to support 
the idea of dialogue with the government, reject the inevitability or 
desirability of confrontation and violence and are willing to acknowledge 
the need to work for change within the system.
Similarly, among government-supporting rank-and-file white voters 
one finds majorities or near-majorities willing to subscribe to the idea 
of a degree of power-sharing between whites and blacks,to the principle 
of black (African) representation in the central legislature and to a wide 
range of political and socio-economic reforms for blacks (provided the con­
sequences do not impinge on the private and semi-private sphere of white
social life --- residential integration being perhaps the prime example of
the threshold where;whites draw the line, as it were). Furthermore, there 
is evidence in the research quoted that, despite a minority right-wing 
reaction, white attitudes in general are shifting steadily in the direction 
of political conciliation and compromise.
2) Key Political Actors
Broadly, rank-and-file attitudes lead one to conclude that there is 
considerable overlap in the minimum expectations of whites and blacks, and 
that there is a potential basis for a fairly broad inter-racial consensus on
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the minimum requirements for a constitution which could be legitimate1 in 
the eyes of all groups, at least as a form of transition towards a more open 
society in the longer-term future.
It would be naive to assume, however, that these patterns and trends 
in popular attitudes will necessarily manifest in short-term modifications 
of basic policy positions among the most relevant echelons of leadership, 
both white and black. With certain very important exceptions like that of 
Chief Buthelezi and the Inkatha movement, the official opposition in 
parliament, certain Homeland leaders and perhaps one or two ministers in the 
present Cabinet, the modal positions among very significant echelons of white 
and black leadership seem virtually irreconcilable. The Prime Minister has 
firmly rejected federal or consociational arrangements involving Africans 
for a future constitution, hence rejecting any notion of power-sharing among 
black and white in favour of what can be termed a ’division* of power on 
a confederal basis (the term used being a * constellation* of states). The 
Coloured Labour Party and the du Preez Commission appointed by that party 
in the Coloured Persons Representative Council, on the other hand, have stood 
firm in insisting on a unitary system with an open franchise. The most 
popular prominent leadership among blacks in the urban areas in the Transvaal 
has taken a stand against participation in government-created local political 
institutions and the impression generally obtained is that it will not depart 
from the principles underlying a unitary-state democracy or * one-man-one-vote *. 
Very substantial numbers of youthful opinion-leaders in the black townships 
are even more fervent in their desire for a complete ’liberation* of blacks 
from any form of white influence, with some of them openly espousing exclusive 
black control in any acceptable future system. Then again, there are leaders 
of former Homelands who have willingly taken their territories to independence 
almost in defiance of majority popular opposition to such developments.
3) The Problem of Forecasting
There are, of course, finer nuances in the situation than the broad 
description above would suggest, but it is sufficiently characteristic of the 
world of key political actors in South Africa to highlight a major problem 
in political forecasting. While one must assume that trends in popular 
attitudes will always have some influence on policies and positions, the 
course of events in the short to medium-term future most probably will be 
dominated by the interaction of key groups of political actors and influence 
groups. The effects of modal trends in popular attitudes on leadership 
positions (always a two-way process) will vary widely from situation to
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situation and from group to group. This makes political forecasting extremely 
difficult. Popular attitudes and interests are relatively stable, fairly easily 
measured and lend themselves to trend-based forecasting. The positions adopted 
by leader-groups and prominent lobbies and influence groups are much less- 
easily extrapolated. Firstly, political contingencies of a variable kind 
often have untoward but significant effects. Secondly, the political process 
among leaders and lobbies is much more deliberate and strategic in orienta­
tion than popular attitudes: a particular viewpoint may be advertised publicly
in order to leave room for manoeuvre, or for several 'fall-back1 positions in 
a bargaining process, in order to consolidate support before changing direction, 
in order to demoralise political opponents, to project an image of political 
"will" and determination or even to be able to collect funds from specific 
sources. These are all part of a process which one authority, F.G. Bailey has 
called 'Stratagems and Spoils'. Predicting future developments among such 
groups therefore requires very substantial in-depth insights.
In South Africa, however, there are additional problems created by 
what are termed conflicting paradigms — — widely different conceptual models 
of political reality. As an early step in making political forecasts, one has 
to understand these models and assess the likelihood of their changing.
4) Conflicting Models of Political Reality
An attempt is made below to outline some major contrasts in the basic 
assumptions and models of political reality held by significant community 
leaders and politicians among blacks and whites. The contrasts as described 
are 'typical' rather than precise pictures of reality, but they are presented 
as 'ideal types* for the sake of clarity. They are not the results of research 
as such, but they are insights which have emerged in the process of interpreting 
and understanding numbers of surveys, group discussions and interviews with key 
informants. The issues described separately below are all closely inter­
connected in the real world.
4-1) Differing 'Existential' Consequences of Segregation and Inequality:
This is the simplest and most obvious contrast in political world 
views (so obvious, in fact, that it is included mainly by way of introduction). 
Whites, particularly those not in daily contact with blacks, do not experience
their own lives as privileged  at a much higher level of living than
ordinary blacks, whites struggle to balance their personal budgets and to 
improve their life-styles. Accusations of inordinate white privilege are simply
not believable. Blacks tend to perceive white standards of living as 
illegitimately enhanced. This is less so among poorly-educated blacks who 
to some extent may see white privilege as the reward for education, skill 
and experience. For educated blacks, particularly unemployed or poorly-paid 
youths, white standards of living appear to be monstrously inappropriate.
Segregation,to take another example, is experienced by most whites 
as little more than the opportunity and right of a group to enjoy its own 
facilities and amenities. Very often they are so accustomed to the benefits 
that they do not reflect upon the rewards. For better-educated blacks who 
have tastes similar to those of whites, the denial of the right to use 
certain amenities is a double injury: the absence of the reward itself
(which causes a sense of deprivation far stronger than the corresponding 
opposite pleasure of enjoying the reward) and the implied injury to self-esteem 
and dignity. The Immorality and Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Acts must be 
viewed in this light as well.
The belief among many whites that the bitterness and discontent of 
more highly-educated blacks is uncalled for or the result of ’political 
agitation’ stems from this ’existential gap’. So does the feeling among 
blacks that whites are callous, selfish and unfeeling. If and when an adequate 
awareness of what can be termed the ’’ongoing existential crisis” of better- 
educated blacks becomes an input into policy formulation and public administra­
tion in South Africa, significant political shifts could take place. (Perhaps 
it should be added immediately that many white politicians will have to repress 
this awareness for some time in order to protect their other models of reality.)
4-2) ’Developmental* versus ’Competitive’ Models
Another basic contradiction in the political thinking of white and 
black leaders lies in the understanding of black under-development. Whites 
generally view the lower standards of living and achievement among blacks 
as intrinsic to the group itself. Even among whites who stand for equality 
of opportunity, many see the black group as a whole as yet having to acquire 
certain attitudes, aptitudes and skills in order to earn rewards equivalent 
to those of whites in modem society. This perception may not be wholly 
wrong in all respects, but its implication is that the ’blame’ is always 
shifted onto the disadvantaged group. This is the ’developmental’ view.
Black opinion-leaders, on the other hand, find it threatening to 
their self-esteem to believe that much more than opportunities for education
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are necessary for blacks to earn equal recognition and privileges in society. 
Restricted opportunities for education and constraints on job-advancement 
thereafter are diagnosed as the major problem. Their view is thus not 
developmental but ‘competitive1 in the sense that they see discrimination as 
the key to black disadvantage.
Neither model is wholly right or wholly wrong, but each view prevents 
people from responding to what is valid in the other view and hence the 
problem, the development gap and the apparent justification for each model, 
persists. At the moment a very basic underpinning of government policy seems 
to be the ‘developmental’ model, i.e. that benefits, rewards and amenities for 
blacks must be assessed against what blacks have had before, not in relation 
to what other groups have. If and when the basic ideology shifts away from 
the developmental toward the competitive model, significant changes in policy 
and public administration could occur.
**“3) Conflicts in ‘Territory’ Models
Conflicting ‘territory* models in political thinking involve funda­
mental differences in notions of to whom the ‘white’ or ‘common’ area of 
South Africa rightfully ’belongs’. On the white side2 in the past there were 
frequent official justifications for Separate Development expressed in terms of 
the myth that white pioneers occupied territory which was not permanently 
settled by blacks. Few people really believed this and it may have been an 
indirect way of claiming ownership of territory by right of conquest. Whatever 
the justification, a basic concept in much white political thinking is the 
notion that whites, as the descendants of pioneers, have a legitimate claim 
on the major part of South Africa as ’their own', or as a territory to be 
shared only with certain groups of non-whites which are historically associated 
with whites (i.e. Coloureds) or with Indians whose numbers are too small to 
challenge the basic identity of the territory.
Blacks generally reject this concept of territory on the basis that 
thejr are the indigenous ’owners’ of the land. Some blacks of a more con­
servative persuasion might concede ownership to whites in terms of rights of 
conquest, but the dominant view is either that blacks have the prior moral 
claim or that the common area belongs to everyone.
In recent years a significant basic shift in government thinking has 
occurred in the sense that the permanency of black settlement in ’white’ urban 
areas is more and more readily acknowledged. At the present time there are
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strong suggestions that the government may be willing to concede a form of 
citizenship to all races on the basis of a confederal whole. Thus the basic 
paradigm is shifting; if and when the shift is sufficient to establish the 
legitimacy of claims to the common territory for all groups, an important 
underlying justification for Separate Development as applicable to Africans 
outside the homelands will disappear. At this point a greater flexibility 
and pragmatism in political policies will be more possible than it is at 
present.
4-4) Basic Concepts of Ethnicity
It is common knowledge that black opinion-leaders reject being 
labelled and administered as Zulus, Pedis, South Sothos, Xhosas and the like. 
This stems from the fact that 1 tribal1 identity is perceived as not being 
’modem* and because it is associated with the policy of separate homelands 
for different tribes. There is a deeper problem, however. Having rejected 
ethnicity, educated, urbanised blacks have great difficulty in conceding 
the legitimacy of ethnic identity among others. Hence the ethnic pride of 
Afrikaners is seen either as a cloak for racism or as a form of rejection of 
non-Afrikaners.
This is why the situation in South Africa is more problematic than 
a situation of purely ethnic conflict (if indeed, any conflict is ever purely 
ethnic). If a territory is inhabited by two groups both with strong ethnic 
feeling then, however intense their conflicts, they will at least recognise 
the legitimacy of each others ethnic feelings. They will be prepared to take 
seriously political options like partition, plural divisions of states or 
ethnic representation. In South Africa, however, while many whites see the 
problems in ethnic terms, most modern blacks experience and perceive the 
problem as one of racism. Some blacks are ethnically rooted themselves and 
are prepared to concede the legitimacy of the Afrikaners’ ethnic strivings. 
This position is not fashionable.
A ’consociational* or ethnically based federal system, while it may 
be very appropriate as a constructive alternative to both Separate Development 
and one-man-one-vote is likely to be resisted by the black intelligentsia 
whose own personal needs are to distantiate themselves from ethnic back­
grounds. If ever modem revivals of traditional ethnic identity take place 
in South Africa, the prospects of a consociational form of government for the 
future will be markedly enhanced. If blacks and whites come to disentangle 
racism from ethnicism in their own basic political ideas, then too will
acceptance of an ethnic consociation become more possible.
4-5) Unsystemic or Non-relational Models of Change
Any society is a system involving interdependence of groups, 
classes, segments and processes. Stability and development require a 
political ’wisdom’ among key actors which is sensitive to such interdependence. 
The high-key ethical viewpoints surrounding political issues in South Africa, 
the strong claims of contending groups and social segregation which limits 
the mutual understanding of each other among groups tends to jeopardise this 
’wisdom’. Various examples can be given.
Integration: many white political actors who desire social separateness for
their own group have generalised this value to encompass a basic resistance 
to ’integration* in a general sense (which they confuse with social intimacy), 
yet any system needs to have its parts and processes ’integrated* in order 
to function. An index of successful integration in a society is the emergence 
of a basic minimum of society-wide shared loyalty to the system. It is 
impossible to integrate some processes and not others. This may even increase 
discontent, because, for example, people will have discrepant statuses in 
different spheres. For many years now the inevitability of economic inte­
gration has been accepted, but until very recently other forms of integration 
were rejected in terms of official policy. At present there is a fairly 
marked trend towards the encouragement of the growth of a black middle-class 
with a stake in the system (i.e. a basic loyalty). Yet moves to stimulate the 
emergence of such a class are partial; even suggestions that limited numbers of 
affluent or prominent blacks be granted exemptions to live in white group 
areas are rejected. A newly-emerged middle-class will be particularly 
sensitive to status-discrepancies, inter alia, because of stresses associated 
with upward mobility. Hence current attempts to secure the loyalty of a 
black middle-class may even be counter-productive.
Another group —— one possibly with great potential bargaining 
power —  is the army of black migrant contract workers who account for roughly 
70% of the black labour force in the common area. After the 1973 strike-wave 
in Durban and elsewhere the need to ’integrate* black labour into a formal 
system of control over labour-relations was increasingly realised and this 
process has resulted in the recent changes in labour lav;. Migrant workers, 
first excluded from the dispensation, are now included; hence a form of inte­
gration of migrant labour has taken place. The integration of migrant workers 
into the formal system of labour relations is not matched by any other ties
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to the system (except of course, the remuneration). This integrative dis­
crepancy renders the system highly vulnerable. A key issue in political 
forecasting is the question of whether or not economically disruptive conflict 
will be avoided. Assessing the speed with which key decision-makers are likely 
to understand the need for * system-integrating reforms* will be crucial to the 
success of forecasting.
Acceptance of the utility of Limited Conflict: a basic model among decision­
makers in State security services over past decades appears to have been the 
notion that certain types of 'opposition* are illegitimate, to an extent 
irrespective of the seriousness of destructive intent in the particular move­
ment. This proposition is based on the apparent fact that some of the people 
restricted in terms of security legislation were activists for reform rather 
than having intentions to subvert the political order (one thinks, for example, 
of the bannings of trade unionists working for black trade-union recognition 
and certain educationalists working in black education outside the formal 
system).
Given the latent strain in South African society and the inter­
nationalising of its internal conflicts the strictness of security measures 
would not surprise a sociologist or political scientist. Yet the effective 
adaptation of a society to internal strain requires an effective 'feedback* 
function. Clearly the feedback has failed in the past; the 1973 strikes, the 
Soweto disturbances being prime examples. Feedback sufficient to avoid these 
disruptive events would have been facilitated if certain critics had been 
taken seriously and certain forms of protest had been allowed and had served 
as warnings. A key issue in forecasting the future course of political 
development and the likelihood of stability will be the sensitivity of the 
security system to distinguish between 'constructive* conflict (albeit 
unpleasant) and subversion or potential subversion. Any changes in basic 
official assumptions regarding security policy thus have to be monitored care­
fully as an adjunct to making political predictions.
Constraints on Idealism or the Acceptance of Second-best options: The possi­
bilities of preventing an escalation of conflict to levels of revolutionary 
fervour depend on the political aspirations of contending groups being limited 
by what is realistically possible given the balance of forces in the society. 
Therefore the prospects of relatively stable evolutionary development depend 
on both black and white political actors in South Africa settling for 'second- 
best* but achievable political goals. The goal of complete socio-political 
separation of blacks from whites, once proudly proclaimed and defended, is
substantially eroded at the present time and new, tentative goals incorporating 
various notions of black-white political interdependence with safeguards are 
gradually and tentatively taking form in establishment political thinking.
Black political goals are variable along a dimension of willing­
ness to accept second-best alternatives but certain very prominent tone- 
setting members of the black elites appear to adhere rigidly to a goal 
(universal franchise in a unitary system) which given the constraints imposed 
by countervailing political interests, is as idealistic as the former ’white' 
goal of complete separation; at least until group identities soften with the 
gradual emergence of links which cut across racial identities. At the heart 
of this problem lies the same implicit ’model’ as mentioned earlier under the 
rubric of ethnicity. Blacks experience the system in racial, not ethnic terms, 
and what might otherwise be considered as moderation is perceived as a 
'compromise with racism'. However remote it may be, the emergence of political 
goals among black elites which make some concessions to group identities (not 
racism) will be extremely significant in future developments.
The 9disadvantaged minority1: A particular factor bearing upon the external
dimension of pressure on South Africa from the western countries is the fact 
that the basic elements of the critique of South Africa are derived from 
racial conflict in the West itself —  mainly the persecution of Jews in Germany 
and later the Soviet Union and anti-black discrimination in the United States. 
The West has experience of the victimisation of minorities and in the U.S.A. of 
the partial success of a human rights movement in reducing the discrimination. 
The same basic conceptual model is applied to South Africa and the third 
world without concession to the fact that in South Africa the question of 
rights relates to a majority much larger than the establishment group (in fact 
this is taken into account in a way to suggest that the discrimination is all 
the more reprehensible because of it). Needless to say this view is en­
couraged by South African practices which include all the forms of social 
and symbolic 'labelling' , segregation and racially-based justificatory 
arguments all too familiar in the West itself.
The solution of problems of minorities, however, in large part 
involves different processes to the problem of integrating societies where 
large scale divisions have implications for the fundamental nature of the 
state and of the society. Minorities can be and have been integrated on the 
establishment's terms as it were, once symbolic resistance was overcome.
Blacks cannot be politically integrated on the white's terms and the nature
of the state will change when this occurs. For this reason political theorists 
of the so-called plural society propose broadly that inter-group accommodation 
take a different form to the assimilation of minorities in the West. Despite 
the persisting examples of Northern Ireland, and Israel-Palestine, the 
Southern African solution is viewed as an extension of the ’civil rights' 
solution with mild concessions to the fact that it may be more difficult to 
solve.
Pressure on South Africa is an important variable in the future and 
this pressure to some degree will be influenced by the model of change 
adopted in the West. Forecasts of the future must involve the monitoring 
of changes in the nature of the models adopted by the West (which has tended 
to be influential in diagnosing the problem for the rest of the world). Simi­
larly the extent to which South Africa can modify the external model by 
removing the type of practice typical of anti-black discrimination in pre- 
civil rights U.S.A. will be an important mediating factor.
5. What have been called models of political reality or paradigjns are
more basic than specific attitudes or opinions. They are belief-systems 
which are associated with patterned sets of attitudes among key political 
actors. Their pattern of variation over time is an important element in the 
mix of indicators required for political forecasting. To illustrate this 
point one need only think of one other basic conceptual change that has 
occurred in government thinking over the past three years; a change which can 
be predicted to influence policies very significantly in time. This has been
the emergence of strategic goals in the political process --- witness the
Prime Minister's concept of a national strategy, the new importance of 
military planners, the drive towards efficiency in the public service and the 
long overdue concern with the quality of life in the urban black townships.
If this model of political planning survives the current resistance to it 
from powerful conservative lobbies a new politics could slowly emerge. The 
same order of consequences might be expected if changes occur in some of the 
other roots of political thinking discussed in this paper.
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